Disaggregated TIPS: The case for disaggregating inflationlinked bonds into bonds linked to narrower CPI components

Slicing and Dicing TIPS
Inflation-linked (real) bonds have been an extraordinary success for both the U.S. Treasury and investors since their 1997 introduction. Real bonds have several advantages, but the fundamental characteristic-being a true inflation hedge-is the most attractive feature. Real bonds' inflation-hedging feature has attracted a wide array of investors, including pensions, foundations, endowments, pre-paid tuition plans and individuals.
In the United States, the inflation hedge on Treasury Inflation Protection Securities (TIPS) is tied to CPI-U, the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. One characterization of inflation applies to all TIPS investors. This is the problem and opportunity that this paper addresses. My inflation is not your inflation. Retirees and retirement plans, for example, might be more sensitive to inflation in medical costs. Parents care about the cost of college tuition. A local foundation cares more about local inflation.
To date, the inflation-linked bond marketplace has not addressed this diversity of inflationhedging needs. The marketplace has, however, addressed time-specific inflation-hedging needs by stripping TIPS into zero-coupon real bonds. This paper investigates whether the precedent of slicing TIPS into time-specific components can, and should, be extended to dicing TIPS into CPI-component disaggregated TIPS. (For readability, I use "disaggregated TIPS" hereafter as shorthand for the more descriptive, but cumbersome, "CPI-component disaggregated TIPS".) Such disaggregated TIPS could then be combined (by either investors or intermediaries) in new ways that reflect investor-specific inflation-hedging needs.
I begin by elaborating on several instances where individual and institutional investors care about inflation tied to their personal basket of consumption goods. After briefly reviewing TIPS, CPI and the stripping process, I demonstrate the mechanics of how TIPS could be "diced" into components. In an appendix, I show the asset-liability efficiency gain for an institutional pension fund facing a liability mix dependent on retirement and retiree health benefits as well as for an individual investor with heavier medical expenses.
Whose inflation? Kneafsey [2003] and Bernstein [2003] represent a back-to-basics approach to investing. Kneafsey poses and answers the question: "What is the investor's problem?" The answer is to fund a stream of liabilities. For most investors, these liabilities are linked, in greater or lesser degree, to inflation. Moore [1999] characterized this as "ubiquitous real liabilities."
It is a natural extension to think of ubiquitous but heterogeneous real liabilities. Individuals, pensions, foundations and endowments face different flavors of inflation. More narrowly, people living in Boston or San Francisco face different housing inflation than those living in Houston or Kansas City. Idiosyncratic inflation experiences are so prevalent that the Bureau of Labor Statistics website prominently displays a link to a fact sheet [2002] on why published averages do not match an individual's inflation experience. Further, the idea of investorspecific inflation mattering is embedded in the asset-liability optimization literature of Sharpe and Tint [1993] ; Leibowitz, Bader and Kogelman [1996] ; Ryan [1999] and Waring [2004] . I discuss different types of inflation mattering to different investors below.
College inflation, for example, captures many investors' attention. College endowments, among the most sophisticated institutional investors, care crucially about their specific inflation; for example, the 2003 Yale Endowment Report specifies that Yale measures real returns relative to college inflation. The state-managed investment pools backing §529 prepaid-tuition plans should be focused on asset-liability optimization where the liability is state-specific college inflation. Many prepaid plans use TIPS in recognition of this liability, but the hedge is imperfect. Disaggregated TIPS linked to the college cost component of CPI would be a better hedge.
Rampant inflation in college costs certainly captures parents' attention. Both the size of the tuition bill and the rate of growth can seem staggering. In response, institutions developed products like the CollegeSure CD, which offers a terminal value linked to college inflation. State college tuition inflation is particularly pernicious because it generally accelerates when a slowing economy hurts many asset classes. The demand for state §529 prepaid-tuition plans is a case of individual investors favoring a product with specific inflation immunization-often state-specific college inflation immunization. Merton [2003] discusses the college-inflation-linked liability at length, but points out that providers of college savings products, rather than investors, now bear the liability risk. The investors, however, acquire counterparty risk. As I discuss below, disaggregated TIPS can avoid counterparty risk.
Similarly, charitable foundations have liabilities in a conceptual rather than a contractual sense. These liabilities-payments to grantees and operating expenses-are tied to inflation because trustees generally seek to preserve intergenerational equity. 1 Because of varied eleemosynary goals, however, the inflation faced by specific charities differs. Salem and Barnes claim it is possible for charities to specify "any institution-specific sensitivities that might logically affect investment policy choices (e.g., material linkages between an institution's overall financial condition and the evolving fortunes of particular industries, companies, political jurisdictions, or the like)" (TIFF [2004] ). Although they make this claim in the context of "off-balance sheet assets" (like prospective donations), the insight applies to liabilities as well. Food banks face volatile food inflation, community-housing initiatives face local housing inflation, and hospital conversion foundations generally focus on health care and face medical inflation. Foundation scholarship programs are like college endowments in facing education inflation.
Pension providers should care about surplus risk. Surplus is a function of the investment pool and two contractual liabilities-a retirement benefit linked to general inflation and a retiree health-care benefit linked to medical inflation. Retiree medical liabilities are nontrivial relative to pension liabilities. The medical liability component alone represents 40% of General Motor's total postretirement benefit liabilities. Medical inflation can be even more important because it is substantially higher than overall inflation. In the twenty years ending January 2004, medical care costs increased 186 percent while non-medical inflation increased only 75 percent. Many companies expect medical inflation to continue to outpace other inflation; IBM, for one, uses actuarial assumptions of 8½% health care cost inflation and 4% compensation inflation. 2 Many pensions use TIPS in recognition of their inflation-linked liability, but the hedge is imperfect given the importance of postretirement health benefits. Disaggregated TIPS linked to the medical care cost component of CPI provide more explicit immunization/collateral and would be a better hedge. 3 We investigate this scenario in detail in the Appendix.
Merton [2003] also introduces the idea of "condo value insurance." He states:
Suppose you are a futures trader who moves to a condo in Chicago. If you are always going to live in Chicago, then whether the price of housing increases or decreases, ownership is a hedge to maintain the same standard of living in housing. But you recognize that you are at some risk of having to move to find work if the futures industry does poorly. If you and others like you have to move at the same time, housing prices are likely to be depressed when you have to make the sale. Ownership is no longer a hedge. Such risk might be better borne, rather than by you, by local institutions that are always going to be located in Chicago and thus have something of a hedge in the form of lower compensation to pay if the real estate market goes down. Perhaps, then, especially for people who are not going to be there permanently, the idea of some kind of floor or insurance of value, like a put option, on the condo might make sense.
In addition to a hedge on current consumption, housing value insurance could serve as a hedge on future consumption. Suppose I have a strong desire to retire to the coast, or suppose an investment banker knows he must return to New York or London after assignment to a regional office. Without exposure to a particular housing market, there is a risk that individuals cannot maintain the same standard of living when they return or retire. Disaggregated TIPS linked to housing inflation could help hedge general housing inflation. This might be of particular interest for expatriates or missionaries who do not know where they will live when they return. They avoid the costs of keeping their house and becoming a landlord. Second-order disaggregated TIPS linked to specific regions' or cities' housing costs, could help support a market for Merton's "condo value insurance" or direct hedging by individuals.
More generally, different individuals have different consumption baskets. Garner, Johnson and Kokoski [1996] analyze an experimental CPI for the poor (who consume proportionally more food and fuel, but less education). At the other extreme, Forbes publishes a tongue-incheek Cost of Living Extremely Well (featuring Dom Perignon, Rolexes, diamonds, etc.) Arrow [1958] felt there should be separate CPIs for every income level. Amble and Stewart [1994] analyze an experimental CPI for the elderly (who consume proportionally more medical care and less education). (I discuss homeowner retirees in more detail in the Appendix.) Regionally, housing is 48% of CPI-U for Boston, but only 37% for Houston and St. Louis. In each case (income, age, or region), the consumption basket and price index differs from the national CPI-U. Disaggregated TIPS-reassembled in customized packages-would be a better hedge than generic TIPS. 4 Given heterogeneous real liabilities, generic TIPS provide only a partial solution. Without greater customization, investors bear more risk. Specifically, they bear basis risk-the risk that their CPI-linked hedge and their own inflation liabilities differ. Disaggregated TIPS address this risk.
The idea of component-specific inflation-linked bonds is not new. Williams [1997] highlights grain-denominated lending and borrowing in ancient Mesopotamia. Shiller [2003] documents 18 th century Massachusetts bonds linked to a four-item basket of goods. Tom Wolfe memorably highlighted the gold-price Giscard bonds in Bonfire of the Vanities. Austria issued bonds indexed to electricity in 1953.
These approaches, however, are one-off attempts at market completeness. Disaggregated TIPS offer a much fuller menu of choices for hedging investors' ubiquitous but heterogeneous real liabilities.
TIPS
I prepare for our discussion of disaggregated TIPS with an inflation-linked bond refresherwhy governments issue them, why investors buy them, how they work and the current state of the market. (For more detail, see Bynjolfsson and Fabozzi [1999] and Deacon, Derry and Mirfendereski [2004] .) For simplicity, I focus on the U.S. TIPS market, but the discussion is generalizable to other inflation-linked bond markets-particularly ones where inflation-linked bonds are strippable (like Canada currently and France and South Africa prospectively).
Governments find the inflation-linked bond market attractive for many reasons. First, central bankers gain more direct insight into inflation expectations. Market-based inflation expectations derived from the TIPS-versus-nominal differential are necessarily superior to prior reliance on surveys of economists. Beyond just providing higher quality information about inflation expectations, there is a greater quantity of information because there is a complete and continuous term structure of inflation expectations. Second, governments can credibly signal their inflation-limiting intensions. Absent TIPS, governments have an incentive to debase their currency thus expropriating wealth from nominal Treasury owners. These owners wisely demand an inflation premium in nominal yields. A robust TIPS market mitigates some of this cost in the nominal market. Furthermore, a robust TIPS market can lower borrowing costs if uncertainty about inflation creates a positive inflation-hedging cost (see Hammond [2003] ). Fourth, offering TIPS diversifies the government's liability portfolio. If investors have habitat preferences, such diversification of debt offerings may lower borrowing costs by diversifying the creditor pool. Fifth, offering TIPS may enhance a government's mean-variance efficiency in asset-liability space because future government revenues are likely correlated with inflation in the long run. Shorter term, TIPS may help budget smoothing if inflation is negatively correlated with revenues. Finally, governments may want a robust TIPS market because it creates a public good.
How does issuing TIPS create a public good? Consider the reasons investors benefit from a TIPS market.
First, it is an explicitly inflation-linked asset. The damage inflation can do to portfolios is obvious to anyone that experienced it in the 1970s and early '80s. Even low inflation can hurt spending power over long horizons. Second, unexpected inflation represents a transfer from creditors to debtors. Third, TIPS low correlation pushes out the mean-variance efficient frontier. Also, TIPS have low volatility. For more risk averse investors, TIPS substantially displace nominal bonds in efficient portfolios. Finally, many investors appreciate TIPS ability to match their liabilities and find they expand their hedging opportunities. This holds in both single period asset-liability optimization and multi-period portfolio survival simulations.
Since introduction in 1997, the TIPS market has expanded to $200 billion, or about 7 percent of the long-term public debt. There are currently 12 issues outstanding with maturities of 2 to 28 years. TIPS experience reasonable demand at auction (bid-to-cover around 2) and liquidity in the dealer market (average daily volumes approaching $3½ billion). 5 Although a global inflation-linked bond market does exist with at least 30 sovereign issuers, the market is dominated by the US and UK.
TIPS pay semiannual interest that depends on the coupon rate and inflation from the bond's "dated date". For example, the 3 5/8 4/15/28s have a reference CPI-U of 161.74000. CPI-U is the non-seasonally adjusted US City Average All Items Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. For the coupon payment on 4/15/04, the reference CPI-U was a linear interpolation between the January and February . TIPS final par value also depends on inflation from the bond's dated date. So, if inflation is 3% a year for the next 24 years, CPI-U will be 377.42, and the Index Ratio will be 2.33350, so the bond will pay $2,333,500 per million of initial par value. In short, both coupons and principal payments on TIPS are linked to inflation. In formulas, the value of coupon and final payments are as follows. 
where the variable names are as described above. The Max(1,IndexRatio date ) reflects the guarantee that deflation will not reduce the final payment below par value.
STRIPS is an acronym for Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities. From inception, TIPS were strippable (see Grieves and Sunner [1999] ) and Barclays Capital did so, calling the components iSTRIPS. This product helps institutional investors build a customized inflation-indexed cash flow stream. Consider, for example, a company with a young workforce and a defined benefit pension plan implicitly linked to inflation. The surplus-optimal asset allocation for a fund with such an inflation-linked liability would likely include long-dated iSTRIPS. Consistent with the Ryan [1999] concept of a custom liability index, iSTRIPS help match the pension liability better than even long-dated TIPS because of the intervening cash flows. In the "slicing and dicing" of my subtitle, iSTRIPS could be seen as slicing (in the time dimension) and serve as a useful model for disaggregating TIPS (in the CPI component dimension), or the dicing of my subtitle. We turn now to CPI to understand how that dicing might work.
The CPI-U is a Laspeyres price index. Roughly, this means it measures price changes over some period for a basket of consumption goods chosen at the beginning of the period. The Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] first determines the proportion of consumption spent on apples, for example. The BLS then determines how prices of apples have changed since the initial basket of goods was determined.
Consider a detailed example now because of the importance of index construction to understanding disaggregated TIPS. Imagine a world with only two kinds of goods-medical care and everything else. Assume medical care is five percent of the initial basket of goods with non-medical goods the remainder. Table 1 calculates the Laspeyres price index if medical inflation is 11 percent and non-medical inflation is 3 percent. Again, the Laspeyres formula multiplies initial weights by ending prices to compute the price index. In Table 1 , this gives an ending price index value of 103.4. Aggregate inflation is 3.4%. Note that if the consumption basket does not change, as Laspeyres assumes, then the proportion spent on the higher-inflation medical goods is more than the initial five percent (0.0555/1.0340, or 5.4%). 
Disaggregated TIPS
In Table 1 , aggregate inflation is 3.4%. Consider how this affects a hypothetical 3% coupon TIPS. Before inflation (at time t=1), it pays $15,000.00 per million face value. For simplicity, assume the coupon is due exactly at time t=2 and this bond's reference CPI-U is 100. Accordingly, the Index Ratio is 1.03400. The hypothetical 3% TIPS will pay a semiannual coupon payment of $15,510.00 per million face value [$1m · .03 · 1.03400 / 2]. Now consider how this 3% TIPS could be "diced" into two disaggregated TIPS-one linked to medical care inflation and the other linked to non-medical inflation. Table 1 assumed medical care was five percent of the initial basket of goods. Accordingly, TIPS with $1 million face value could be diced into $50,000 in medical care and $950,000 in non-medical disaggregated TIPS. Before inflation (at time t=1), the medical care disaggregated TIPS would receive a $750.00 coupon payment [$50,000 · .03 · 1.00000 / 2] and the non-medical disaggregated TIPS would receive $14,250.00 [$950,000 · .03 · 1.00000 / 2]. The two coupons sum to the original $15,000.00 per million face value. See Table 2 . Recall that Table 1 assumed medical care was 5.0 percent of the initial basket of goods but that the higher (11%) medical inflation caused it to grow to approximately 5.4 percent of consumption at time t=2. Which of these is most relevant to dicing TIPS? Because CPI-U is a Laspeyres price index, initial basket weights are crucial. Note that the $1 million TIPS was disaggregated into $50,000 in medical care and $950,000 in non-medical disaggregated TIPSand these par values did not change when computing time t=2 coupons. The disaggregated par value weights must remain proportional to original basket weighting, not the new weighted value. (Of course, the $832.50 medical disaggregated TIPS coupon tracks the price index and is approximately 5.4 percent of the $15,000.00 aggregate TIPS coupon.) Below, I give more-general formulas for disaggregated TIPS. They accommodate different Index Ratios for the CPI components and different break-ups of CPI. The value of coupon and final payments are as follows.
PrincipalPmt maturity = Par × Weight initial × SubIndexRatio date (4) SubIndexRatio is the Index Ratio for the CPI component; Weight initial is the percentage of the overall CPI basket the CPI component represents at the time of disaggregation. The term (Par × Weight initial ) is the par value of the disaggregated TIPS.
Extended example
Note for the journal editor: If space is a constraint, the extended example could either be deleted or moved to an appendix or a www-based supplement.
We will now step through a more realistic example. This should provide a more comprehensive proof of concept.
Assume the 3 5/8% 2028 TIPS described above were disaggregated immediately after the From $1 million in TIPS, nine disaggregated TIPS are created. (This is one for each of the eight main CPI components; note that it excludes energy, which is in more than one category but which might make an attractive disaggregated TIPS.)
Obviously, it is crucial that the rules for determining basket weights be clearly articulated. The BLS regularly publishes data on the relative importance of different CPI components; care should be taken with these since they reflect both original basket weights and subsequent inflation. In equation (4), Weight initial is relative the overall CPI basket at the time of CPI "re-basketing" date immediately before the reference date for the aggregate TIPS. For this bond, weights from 1993-1995 were in use in 1998 when the bond was issued. These weights are multiplied by the $1 million par value of the TIPS to be disaggregated to get the component s' par values.
Reference CPI-Us are computed for each component in the same way as they were for the aggregate TIPS. (For the 4/15/2028 bond, it is a 7/30 interpolation between the January and February 1998 CPI-Us.) 
Technicalities
While I hope the notion of disaggregated TIPS appears intuitive, the process of actually implementing such securities might be somewhat problematic. Below, I consider a range of potential complications for the idea of disaggregated TIPS:
Operational issues: Book-entry systems at the Federal Reserve and dealers would need to be modified to accommodate disaggregated TIPS. Each disaggregated TIPS created would require its own CUSIP.
To separate a conventional book-entry TIPS into CPI-specific component with par values of $1000, the normal minimum, could require a significant initial position. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the relative importance of CPI components are normally presented to the hundred-thousandths place (e.g., 6.019%). This would require $100 million up front-a nontrivial sum. Alternatively, a less granular rounding scheme could be agreed to; for example, rounding to the thousandths place (e.g., 6.0%) would only require $1 million-an amount comparable to that necessary for stripping TIPS (see Grieves and Sunner [1999] ). The less granular approach could be combined with a norm that the residual accrues to a particular CPI component (e.g., other goods and services). This approach could also be used when, due to rounding, the component weights do not sum exactly to 100%.
Granularity:
There is an additional granularity issue. Notice that Table 4 shows $20,811.00 in total coupons. This compares to the $20,806.23 we computed earlier in the paper for the full TIPS. The difference is small-less than one-twentieth of a basis point. Part of this difference is discussed in the next section on reweighting the CPI, but part of the difference is attributable to granularity in reported CPI numbers. Price indices are reported to one decimal place. The difficulty arises when this level of rounding is used for large dollars of disaggregated TIPS. Again, the solution to this problem could be to assign the residual to a particular CPI component.
Reweighting the CPI:
While an investor might desire bonds exactly linked to a specific CPI-of-interest, changes to the basket of goods making up the aggregate CPI complicate the approach recommended here. Regular TIPS are linked to CPI-U with its changing basket weights. If the disaggregation process depends on a non-governmental intermediary that intermediary would bear some "re-basketing" risk. Such a process introduces counterparty risk. These risks, although presumably compensated, hurt the fundamental attractiveness of disaggregated-CPI TIPS.
The way around these two risks is to assure that the CPI guarantees in TIPS pass unabated to disaggregated-CPI TIPS. This means any changes to the weighting of a CPI component will affect the payoff of the related disaggregated TIPS. For example, health care's weight declined from 6.387% in 1990 to 5.768% in 1999, but rose to 6.074% in 2003.
Below, I give more-general formulas for disaggregated TIPS. They accommodate different Index Ratios for the CPI components and different break-ups of CPI. The value of coupon and final payments are as follows. (6) where
Equation (7) makes the adjustment for "re-basketing" the CPI. 6 The consequence of this approach is reduced counterparty risk but increased basis risk-investors receive good, but incomplete, hedging of their specific inflation.
The TIPS deflation hedge: Regular TIPS contain a promise that the final principal payment will be at least $1000-even if there is deflation from reference CPI-U of the bond's "dated date". The Max(1,IndexRatio date ) term in equation (2) reflects this guarantee.
Note that this is an aggregate promise, not a component-by-component promise. Even if some goods experience deflation, inflation in other goods may offset that and vitiate the aggregate deflation guarantee. Effectively, the Treasury gains from holding a "portfolio" of commitments tied to different types of inflation. Inflation offsets component deflation.
The fact that the TIPS deflation guarantee is not component-by-component explains why equations (4) and (6) do not have a no-deflation Max(1,SubIndexRatio date ) term like equation (1) . Resolving this proposition (a low-likelihood one, in my view) is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Variable inflation risk premium: Simple analysis assumes that TIPS yield-to-maturity plus expected inflation equals nominal Treasuries' YTM. A more sophisticated approach recognizes that the nominal YTM includes an inflation risk premium that compensates investors for uncertainty about future inflation. See Hammond et al. [1999] . Working backward from the nominal YTM, this implies TIPS pricing reflects an inflation risk premium.
If TIPS were disaggregated, it is reasonable to expect cross-sectional differentials in both inflation expectations and inflation risk premiums. Uncertainty about medical inflation, for example, might lead to bigger inflation risk premiums for medical disaggregated TIPS. But like supply and demand differentials, this is not a problem. If TIPS can be freely disaggregated and reassembled, arbitrage opportunities suggest that we can expect that disaggregated TIPS prices will reflect the market's aggregate judgment and that variable inflation risk premiums won't create imbalances. In fact, we might expect the regular TIPS market to be more efficient. Disaggregated TIPS provide a market-driven price for inflation; component-specific inflation risk premiums are incorporated.
Taxation: Under the Internal Revenue Code, capital gains are generally taxed without adjusting for inflation. With TIPS, the inflation-adjustment to principal is treated as if it were a zero coupon bond. Although the principal payment may be years away, the increase in the Index Ratio and future principal payment is treated as current income and taxed each year. For this reason, many advise individuals to hold TIPS in tax-advantaged accounts. There is nothing in the design of disaggregated TIPS that should preclude them from being treated the same way as regular TIPS under the tax code.
Conclusion
Earlier, I mentioned the grain-priced lending of ancient Mesopotamia. My paper is effectively a call for a return to the commodity-specific nature of the Mesopotamian receipts. Doing so will help complete financial markets by allowing more-specific inflation hedging. This article is in the spirit of Bach and Musgrave [1941] , an early call for creating inflationlinked Treasuries, in both describing both the benefits and technical details of the proposed product-CPI-component disaggregated TIPS.
Investors gain from having an inflation-linked asset that is tied to the inflation that they most directly face. As I show in the Appendix, the risk-return-correlation attributes of disaggregated TIPS push out the efficient frontier-particularly in an asset-liability context. Restated, disaggregated TIPS expand the hedging opportunities of heterogeneous private investors. The government gains by creating a private good that benefits investors. It further gains by having market-based measures of specific types of inflation.
The concept advanced here is not without limitations-notably the potential for acceptance. Acceptance and understanding of TIPS themselves has been slow and limited (see Arnott [2003] ). Adoption of more-specialized inflation products like TIPS futures, CPI futures, iSTRIPS and inflation-linked swaps is not encouraging. Inflation futures have been unpopular, and less than one percent of TIPS have been stripped. Inflation-linked swaps, the most successful of the specialized products, are a small but growing part of the investment landscape; like inflation-linked swaps, disaggregated TIPS compliment the main TIPS market by adding flexibility and creating opportunities for financial engineering to meet investment objectives unavailable in the native TIPS market. My hope in proposing disaggregated TIPS is that these capabilities induce acceptance.
Why shouldn't this idea of bonds linked to custom CPI baskets be handled in the OTC derivatives market? The quick answer is liquidity and counterparty risk. While there is a well-developed global interest rate swap market and a growing inflation-swap market, a disaggregated TIPS market of the sort described above would enhance liquidity because of the government endorsement and standardization. Inflation purchasers (investors) gain by knowing a standardized marketplace exists for them to unwind their custom-inflation position.
8 They also avoid the risk of counterparty default. Inflation payers (issuers) gain the benefit of a disaggregated inflation market without the risks and logistical difficulties associated with creating it themselves. The order matching process is much more continuous with disaggregated TIPS than in a one-off swaps market.
While various commodity futures contracts exist and are certainly real assets, there are at least two problems that prevent them serving as substitute for disaggregated TIPS. First, they offer an incomplete menu of hedging opportunities (both in scope and time horizon). Second, they are imperfect-generally too volatile-hedge (Kaplan and Lummer [1998] and Strongin and Petsch [1997] ). This paper describes both a problem and a solution. Even if the mechanics of the solution require further refinement, the problem of ubiquitous but heterogeneous real liabilities (i.e., non-standard inflation hedging needs) remains, and I hope the financial marketplace moves to address them. 
Appendix-Applying disaggregated TIPS to pensions
Below I introduce two scenarios-for an institutional investor and an individual one. In the scenarios, I motivate why they care crucially about particular baskets of inflation-indexed liabilities.
Institutional case: Most public pensions have explicit or implicit inflation-adjusted retirement benefits. As discussed in the body of the paper, postretirement health benefits are a significant portion of the overall pension promise to retirees. In 2003, a number of states (e.g., California, Texas) modified their plans to reflect the growing realization of this issue.
These liabilities are large and increasing. IBM's inflation assumptions (8½% health care cost inflation and 4% compensation inflation) make a nice case study. If these differentials persist for only five years, health care costs will be up more than twice (2.32×) the broaderbased compensation inflation (50% versus 22%). (The author is familiar with actuarial assumptions showing both much higher medical inflation and differentials lasting much longer.) With statistics like these, it is easy to see why pensions are concerned; further, it is intuitive to see why pensions might gravitate to financial products that help meet these inflation-linked liabilities.
Individual case:
The purchasing pattern of retirees differs from workers. Typical retirees, for example, spend significantly more on medical care. Because of this upweight on rapidly growing medical costs, retirees' inflation is almost always higher than general inflation. This discrepancy has led to arguments for linking Social Security to a custom consumer price index for the elderly [CPI-E] . See Amble and Stewart [1994] .
In constructing an experimental CPI-E, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found the consumption basket of the typical retiree had twice (2.02×) the medical care expense of the typical worker. Housing costs comprised almost 46% of the CPI-E.
The BLS uses an imputed rent approach to housing inflation. Many retirees, however, own their homes, so housing inflation is not a significant part of their "felt" inflation. If we jack-knife housing costs out of the CPI-E, to obtain a measure of the inflation felt by homeowner retirees (and financed by their investment portfolios), medical care grows to almost one-fifth of the index. See Figure A1 for the respective consumption baskets.
Figure A1
Analysis: This is the situation I analyze. A retiree is optimizing in asset-liability space.
The liability is inflation-linked with a 20/80 split between medical and non-medical inflation.
Similarly, a hypothetical Teachers' Retirement System must fund an overall-inflation retirement benefit liability and a medical-inflation retiree health benefit liability. I assume the 20/80 split between medical and non-medical inflation holds to allow us to merge the individual and institutional examples. Below, I simply refer to the "investor." Table A1 presents the investor's optimization inputs. The less-than-historical equity risk premium is conservative. Recent experience in medical inflation supports the medical versus non-medical disaggregated TIPS premium. I assume the investor currently has a surplus 11 -the asset-liability ratio is 1.2 to 1. After optimizing in asset-liability space, one obtains the results in Table A2 . Because many people find moves "north" and "west" in risk-return space (return-enhancing and risk-reducing moves, respectively) more intuitive, I focus on them rather than on maintaining a constant risk aversion coefficient. As expected, adding TIPS to the asset-liability space shifts the efficient frontier northwest. Many researchers find that adding TIPS to stock/bond portfolios enhances portfolio efficiency and that TIPS displace ordinary bonds along much of the efficient frontier.
12 My results, in asset-liability space, are consistent with the earlier research. With Table A1 optimization inputs, adding TIPS to the investment opportunity set leads to either 7% less risk or a dramatic 21 basis point increase in expected surplus returns.
The results for disaggregated TIPS are striking. With Table A1 optimization inputs, adding disaggregated TIPS leads to either 64% less risk or a 75 basis point increase in expected surplus return. These are astounding efficiency gains. The results are an artifact of the dramatic, but plausible, inputs for medical inflation.
Note that the efficient portfolios listed hold only stocks and medical-inflation disaggregated TIPS with no nominal bonds, ordinary TIPS or non-medical disaggregated TIPS. This is true across much of the efficient frontier; at lower risk aversions, a combination of medical and non-medical disaggregated TIPS forms the bulk of the portfolio. See Figure A2 . Except in the lowest risk aversion region, TIPS and nominal bonds are totally displaced and play no part in the efficient portfolio. For individuals and pensions facing high and uncertain medical care inflation, the medical inflation disaggregated TIPS are extremely attractive. They are both a liability hedge and a high return-per-unit-risk asset.
The case study considered in this Appendix is a joint one pertaining to both individual pensioners and institutional pension funds. In it we demonstrate that because investors should care about customized inflation, disaggregating the CPI-U inflation-adjustment component of TIPS helps improve portfolio efficiency.
Generally, more complete financial markets enhance efficiency; the increased granularity of disaggregated TIPS makes markets more complete. Particularly, disaggregated TIPS help solve the pension investor's problem of ubiquitous but heterogeneous real liabilities. Figure A2 
